CRedskinsRule
05-25-2010, 04:50 PM
2 good comments from the comment section of JTF's article:
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It was reported that the BOP couldn't cut the joint, which is a small percentage of the pipe area, and there is no reason why there would be a joint in that position. That's why it was acceptable, and that isn't what failed. And the 260 failure modes are simply all the theoretical ways it could fail, that doesn't mean they are design flaws. Like your car could fail to start because the battery was dead, or the car is out of gas, or the fuel pump doesn't work, or the injectors are clogged, or the ECM is shot, etc.
Posted by theCleverBulldog in reply to a comment from Jamie Friedland
May 13, 2010 6:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
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That's not exactly right. There is a specific reason a pipe joint might be aligned with the shears: because that's where the pipe happened to be when the disaster struck. Joints make up a specific percentage of the entire drill pipe surface and they pass through the ram shears at regular intervals. Sure, the *odds* are better that it won't be so aligned. But the odds are WELL on this side of "likely" when designing a fail-safe device. And while Jamie doesn't mention it here, there is actually some question if the shears were strong enough to cut the pipe they were using at all. Apparently this rig might have been using a more difficult to cut pipe than the BOP was rated for (in good working order - which this one was not) to handle the depth pressures.
I do think you are correct about the meaning of the 260 failure modes. But there are about a dozen specific modifications that were made to this unit (including hooking up non-working test rams to the circuit that was supposed to be running the shears), and several identified problems such as leaking hydraulics (which needed to be pressurized by ROV). There are also some issues about the BOP reliability in general and types of tests that they routinely fail.
It looks like plenty of ancillary blame to go around - i.e. person [x] could have prevented it at any number of stages along the way if they had just done their jobs better. The whole damn industry needs a serious kick in the ass IMO. But as best I can tell, this is starting to look pretty bad for BP as the final point of critical breakdown. Even if the Halliburton cement job did cause a gas bubble - it was a documented potential problem. Considering the BOP was all fucked up and literally modified, it's hard to blame Halliburton for the backup safety mechanisms ALL failing.
Posted by kgb999 in reply to a comment from theCleverBulldog
May 13, 2010 8:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
user-pic
It was reported that the BOP couldn't cut the joint, which is a small percentage of the pipe area, and there is no reason why there would be a joint in that position. That's why it was acceptable, and that isn't what failed. And the 260 failure modes are simply all the theoretical ways it could fail, that doesn't mean they are design flaws. Like your car could fail to start because the battery was dead, or the car is out of gas, or the fuel pump doesn't work, or the injectors are clogged, or the ECM is shot, etc.
Posted by theCleverBulldog in reply to a comment from Jamie Friedland
May 13, 2010 6:27 PM | Reply | Permalink
user-pic
That's not exactly right. There is a specific reason a pipe joint might be aligned with the shears: because that's where the pipe happened to be when the disaster struck. Joints make up a specific percentage of the entire drill pipe surface and they pass through the ram shears at regular intervals. Sure, the *odds* are better that it won't be so aligned. But the odds are WELL on this side of "likely" when designing a fail-safe device. And while Jamie doesn't mention it here, there is actually some question if the shears were strong enough to cut the pipe they were using at all. Apparently this rig might have been using a more difficult to cut pipe than the BOP was rated for (in good working order - which this one was not) to handle the depth pressures.
I do think you are correct about the meaning of the 260 failure modes. But there are about a dozen specific modifications that were made to this unit (including hooking up non-working test rams to the circuit that was supposed to be running the shears), and several identified problems such as leaking hydraulics (which needed to be pressurized by ROV). There are also some issues about the BOP reliability in general and types of tests that they routinely fail.
It looks like plenty of ancillary blame to go around - i.e. person [x] could have prevented it at any number of stages along the way if they had just done their jobs better. The whole damn industry needs a serious kick in the ass IMO. But as best I can tell, this is starting to look pretty bad for BP as the final point of critical breakdown. Even if the Halliburton cement job did cause a gas bubble - it was a documented potential problem. Considering the BOP was all fucked up and literally modified, it's hard to blame Halliburton for the backup safety mechanisms ALL failing.
Posted by kgb999 in reply to a comment from theCleverBulldog
May 13, 2010 8:55 PM | Reply | Permalink